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ABSTRACT 
 
Proposed resolutions to the Arab-Israeli water conflict 
that fail to consider the introduction of alternative 
freshwater sources in the not-too-distant future cannot 
be taken seriously. Each of three major forms of 
freshwater supply augmentation (the “unconventional 
supplies”) is likely to be implemented on a widespread 
basis in the region, thereby substantially altering the 
regional water balance. These unconventional supplies 
are desalination, water imports, and the reclamation of 
wastewater. This paper assesses the relevance of the 
unconventional supplies in achieving regional 
accommodation over shared and scarce freshwater, with 
particular attention to the advantages, disadvantages, 
and complexities introduced by wastewater reclamation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The water resources shared by Israel, Jordan, the 
Palestinian Territories, and Syria1 are not sufficient to 
meet human freshwater demand.  The shared waters in 
question include the Jordan River and its tributaries, 
several coastal rivers whose watersheds encompass both 
Israeli and Palestinian territory (See Figure 1), and two 
aquifer systems whose hydrologic boundaries straddle 
the “Green Line,” the border between the West Bank 
and Israel proper (See Figure 2). Annual human use of 
the region’s water resources currently surpasses the 
“safe” or sustainable2 annual freshwater yield by nearly 
500 MCM/annum. Future deficits are projected to range 
from 800 MCM to 3.4 x 109 m3 (BCM)/annum by the year 
2040 (NAS, 1999). The scarcity of freshwater in the 
region, compounded by (1) the impairment of existing 
resources by a variety of pollutant inputs, and (2) the 
historic political tension among the riparian neighbors, 
makes the Arab-Israeli case one of the most seemingly 
intractable water disputes to be found anywhere. 
 
Many insightful analyses of the Arab-Israeli water 
dispute have examined competing claims for existing 
resources (as well as the evolution and legitimacy of 
these claims) and the distribution of scarcity among the 
inhabitants of the region. Hillel (1994) places the 
question of Middle East water scarcity in its proper 
natural scientific and historical context. The 
proceedings of the first international conference on the 
Arab-Israeli water conflict (which took place in 
Switzerland in 1992) are presented by Isaac and Shuval 
(1994). Lonergan and Brooks (1995) provide a 
comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis of the conflict 
that highlights, among other obstacles, the difficulties 
associated with poor data sharing and availability. Lowi 
(1995) offers an analysis informed by the theories of 
power dynamics and interstate behavior in the 
international relations literature, while Wolf (1995) 
examines the degree to which water scarcity may have 
driven political and military decisionmaking (the so-
called “hydraulic imperative”). Abouali (1996) offers a 
criticism of the current distribution of water resources 
based on several bodies of international law. Allan 
(1996) points out that the international food trade has 
had an important influence on the regional water 
conflict because cereal and vegetable imports amount to 
imports of “virtual water.” (Virtual water is the water 
manifest in agricultural products. Imported grains or 
vegetables can – indeed, should – be thought of as 
imported water. This point is particularly noteworthy 
since food self-sufficiency in the region, given even 
present populations, is simply not a possibility. Food 
self-sufficiency in the lands of Israel, Jordan, the 
Palestinian territories, and the portions of southwestern 
Syria located within the Jordan-Yarmuk watershed 
would require an annual freshwater stock of some 7.2 x 
109 m3 (BCM), a value well above the renewable volume 
of freshwater that is available even in years of 
extremely high precipitation.3) Elmusa (1998) offers an 
additional political-economic perspective as well as 
revisiting the unratified yet influential Johnston 
agreement. Haddad and Feitelson (Haddad et al. 1999; 
Haddad and Feitelson 1997; Haddad and Feitelson 
1994a; Haddad and Feitelson 1994b) coordinated five 
years of policy-oriented research on an aquifer system 
whose hydrologic boundaries span the border between 
  45 
the West Bank and Israel proper, concluding that 
cooperative Israeli-Palestinian management represents a 
genuine win-win solution for the riparians. More 
focused work by Feitelson and Abdul-Jaber (1997) 
examines varying institutional approaches to jointly 
managing wastewater in the region of Jerusalem and its 
environs. 
 
 
Municipal Demand Management Will Not Resolve the 
Shortfall.  
 
Water availability in the region of the Jordan River 
watershed is replete with uncertainty, based largely on 
extreme climatic variability. Over the past century, the 
coefficient of variation for total annual precipitation 
falling over Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, defined as 
the sample standard deviation divided by the interannual 
mean, is approximately 25 percent (Stanhill and 
Rapaport 1988). 
 
One uncertainty is that total water demand in the region 
is likely to rise with population. The only eventuality 
that could precipitate a leveling off (or even decline) in 
demand is a decline in per-capita water use whose 
magnitude offsets the concurrent increase in population. 
Such a scenario will occur only with a massive 
allocation shift of water away from irrigated agriculture 
to municipal and industrial users. At the same time, the 
sudden and complete diversion of water away from 
irrigated agriculture to other uses is neither likely nor 
necessarily desirable, since agriculture represents an 
established way of life for a significant fraction of the 
regional population as well as a form of open-space 
protection in much of the region, particularly coastal 
Israel.4  
 
Relative to the rest of the world, water use in the Middle 
East is quite low. While gross mean per-capita water 
consumption differs substantially among Israel, Jordan, 
and the Palestinian territories (as well as Syria, 
assuming its consumption patterns in the Yarmuk basin 
are generally similar to those of its Jordanian neighbor), 
the regional mean value is extremely low, at ~95 
m3/annum (NAS 1999). Israel, whose consumption is by 
far the highest among the countries in question, uses an 
estimated 330 m3/annum (NAS 1999), half the global 
average (Gleick 1993). Hillel (1994) reports that 
agricultural water use efficiency is exceedingly high in 
the study area, particularly in Israel, relative to other 
parts of the world, due to the widespread application of 
drip and microsprayer irrigation technology. 
Meanwhile, mean gross non-agricultural water use in 
the study area is ~80 m3/annum – nearly a fifth below 
minimum water requirement for mixed domestic and 
industrial needs proposed by Shuval (Shuval 1992). 
On the one hand, the implementation of water 
conservation measures in all sectors remains a sensible 
policy. It has been estimated that freshwater demand in 
Israel could be reduced by as much as 15-20 percent 
(GTZ and Engineers 1996), an equivalent reduction of 
some 280-390 MCM/annum based on 1997 consumption 
data reported by the Israeli Hydrological Service (State 
of Israel 1999). Potential for water use reductions also 
exists on the Jordanian side in the form of increased 
irrigation efficiency (through drip and microsprayer 
systems) and improvements to the water delivery 
infrastructure. The latter is also a critical policy matter 
for the Palestinians. “Unaccounted-for” water amounts 
to well over 50 percent of water consumption in Jordan 
and between 40 percent and 50 percent in the 
Palestinian territories (GTZ and CES Consulting 
Engineers 1996). In some cases these are bonafide 
losses through pipe leakage but in others, the term 
“loss” is misleading since the unaccounted-for volume 
is explained by un-authorized connections to the 
distribution system. The “loss” is an economic loss to 
the state (or independent water utility, whatever the case 
may be) but it does not represent “wasted” water since 
the missing flow is ultimately reaching human end 
users. 
 
Figure 3 (See Figure 3) indicates the present extent of 
freshwater shortfall – approximately 500 MCM/annum – 
based on the estimates of freshwater availability in the 
region and most recent estimates of water consumption. 
Two important dynamics must be gleaned from the 
figure. First, as discussed above, the bar on the right 
side of the balance will inevitably rise as the 
conventional water sources on the left side of the 
balance will remain fixed. Second, there is substantial 
uncertainty associated with water availability based on 
climatic variability, as mentioned above. Human use is 
responsive to these climatic variations, but not in a 
linear way. Policy response to drought in Israel, for 
example, is as follows: allocations to urban users remain 
unchanged on a per-capita basis while voluntary 
municipal conservation campaigns are put in place. 
Agricultural water outlays, on the other hand, are 
substantially reduced, though not in a direct inverse 
relationship with rainfall. In Jordan, water scarcity is so 
acute that municipal use is rationed during the summer. 
These policy responses are not sufficient to meet 
expected increases in demand. Thus we must also turn 
to supply augmentation as a means of alleviating 
freshwater scarcity. This requires looking past “virtual 
water” imports to alternative sources of freshwater, such 
as desalination (of both seawater and brackish water), 
direct water imports from outside of the immediate 
region, and the reclamation of treated wastewater. The 
purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of 
these alternative or “unconventional” sources of water, 
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particularly with respect to how the implementation of 
wastewater reclamation could bear on the water 
relations among the riparians of the Jordan River 
watershed. 
 
 
THE “UNCONVENTIONAL SUPPLIES”: AN 
OVERVIEW 
 
 
Seawater Desalination. 
 
Desalination generally refers to any engineered process 
that removes dissolved solids (salts) from seawater, 
brackish water, or treated wastewater. According to the 
State of California, 60 percent of the global desalination 
capacity is currently situated in the Persian/Arabian 
Gulf region (California Coastal Commission 1999), 
where freshwater scarcity is severe and substantial 
petroleum-derived capital is available. Throughout the 
rest of the Middle East (including the Jordan River 
watershed and its environs), implementation of 
desalination technology has been limited by its 
economic cost relative to the economic cost of 
“available” alternatives (such as groundwater, even as 
aquifer resources are extracted at rates surpassing that of 
recharge). 
 
There are two principal technologies for desalination: 
distillation and membrane treatment (such as 
nanofiltration and reverse osmosis). Distillation 
involves evaporating water under high temperatures and 
pressures and then capturing the re-condensed and 
desalted steam. Membrane treatment describes the 
process of forcing saline water through an extremely 
fine filter that retains the salts. In each case, the outputs 
of the desalination process are twofold: (1) relatively 
fresh product water with total dissolved solids (TDS) 
concentrations ranging from 1 to 500 parts per million 
(ppm) and (2) highly salt-concentrated waste brine. The 
volume of freshwater product relative to the volume of 
input water is often referred to as the “recovery” rate. 
For seawater desalination facilities, the recovery value 
generally ranges from 15-50 percent, which is to say 
that generally, greater than half of the volume of input 
seawater is returned as waste brine with salinities far 
higher than that of seawater. Recovery values tend to 
increase as the salinity of the input water decreases; 
recoveries for brackish water and treated wastewater 
desalination, for example, are well above those for 
seawater. 
 
Largely by virtue of its energy requirements, economic 
costs of seawater desalination are extremely high. The 
State of California reports that the full-time operation of 
the Santa Barbara, California reverse osmosis facility 
for seawater desalination, which was designed to 
desalinate 9.3 MCM/yr to 300 ppm TDS at 
approximately 45 percent recovery, would require 
approximately 50 million kWh/yr. The State asserts that 
this value is roughly double the energy requirement for 
importing water to the California coast from the 
Colorado River, several thousand miles away. Seawater 
desalination is several orders of magnitude more 
energy-demanding than oil refining or steel production, 
whose typical energy requirements for small to midsize 
facilities are somewhere around 100,000 kWh/yr 
(California Coastal Commission 1999). 
 
Estimates of the real economic costs for providing 
freshwater from conventional sources in Israel, for 
example, range from $0.30-$0.70/m3 in 1996 dollars, as 
compared with between $0.70/m3 (GTZ and CES 
Consulting Engineers 1996) and $1.50/m3 (in 1993 
dollars) for desalination of water whose TDS 
concentration is greater than 5000 ppm (Lonergan and 
Brooks 1995). In California, seawater desalination costs 
are estimated to vary from $0.80 to $3.20/m3 (California 
Coastal Commission 1999). 
 
As demand for freshwater increases with population, 
and technical innovation lowers costs, desalination 
technology is becoming more competitive with other 
sources, particularly as freshwater demand outpaces 
conventional supplies. Indeed, the Israeli lay press has 
already quoted officials at Mekorot, the Israeli 
government water company, as arguing that the agency 
could produce desalinated water from the Mediterranean 
for under $0.70/m3 (Cohen 2000b). 
 
Increasing the scale of a proposed facility can vastly 
reduce the unit cost of desalination, but it will also 
require massive initial capital investment.  The Israelis 
have already begun appeals for foreign assistance in the 
production of an extremely large-scale seawater 
desalination plant: an 800 MCM/annum facility that 
would be the world’s largest by a factor of four 
(Makovsky 1999).5 The largest existing seawater 
desalination plant located in Saudi Arabia has a capacity 
of approximately 180 MCM/yr. 
 
Indeed, the possibility of construction of such a giant 
desalination facility forces a radical rethinking of the 
management of water resources in the Jordan watershed 
region in general. Until very recently, water resources 
development among the riparians of the Jordan River 
was treated almost uniformly as a domestic affair.6  
Israel constructed its National Water Carrier to deliver 
water from the Sea of Galilee to its coastal population 
centers, for example, while Jordan built its King 
Abdullah (East Ghor) Canal to provide water from the 
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Yarmuk River to Jordanian farmers on the east bank of 
the Jordan River. (De facto states of war precluded 
genuine cooperative management, although the Unified 
Plan offered by American envoy Eric Johnston in 1955 
came surprisingly close.) 
 
The notion of installing a large and expensive seawater 
desalination facility along the Israeli coast is 
inconceivable without some degree of multilateralism, 
or what Patricia Wouters (2000) has referred to as 
“hydrosolidarity.” In its initial efforts to procure foreign 
aid for desalination, Israel has actually floated the idea 
of the facility being a truly regional one, serving not 
only Israel but also Jordan and the Palestinians 
(Makovsky 1999). Large-scale multilateral water 
planning of the kind in present discussion represents a 
true departure from previous policy. An even more 
dramatic feature of the desalination option is that it 
would clearly be optimized by the redistribution of large 
portions of the inland water resources away from Israel 
back to the Arab riparians, while Israeli users along the 
coast would consume the desalinated supply. The logic 
for such a redistribution would be the massive energy 
savings associated with gravity-powered delivery of 
water from source to consumer (See Figure 4).  
 
The possibility of the construction of a regional 
seawater desalination facility will require a level of 
technical cooperation largely unseen in the region to 
date. For example, in the event that the Sea of Galilee 
becomes a reservoir principally for Jordanian or 
Palestinian freshwater consumption while remaining 
sovereign Israeli territory, Israel must be reasonably 
expected and counted upon for proper stewardship of 
the lake and protection of its quality. This expectation 
can only be conditioned on trust and genuine good 
relations far beyond what have been demonstrated in 
Israeli-Jordanian or Israeli-Egyptian relations up to the 
time of this writing. Without a doubt, it will require 
major revisions of existing water agreements between 
Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians, respectively, with 
more focused attention to be paid to water quality 
protection. 
 
 
Water Imports.  
 
Discussions of actual (as opposed to virtual) water 
imports to the Middle East from regions blessed with 
“surplus” water resources have abounded in recent 
years. The conveyance of water may be achieved either 
through overland transport (via pipeline) or marine 
transport (via tanker, vinyl bags, or submerged 
pipeline).  (See Figure 5)  The GTZ and CES 
Consulting Engineers (1996) present diversion options 
to Israel and/or the Palestinian territories from the 
Manavgat and/or Seyhan-Ceyhan Rivers (Turkey), the 
Litani River (Lebanon), and the Euphrates River (Iraq). 
For exceedingly obvious political reasons, the import of 
water from the Iraqi reaches of the Euphrates cannot be 
expected to occur in the foreseeable future, nor can it 
necessarily be assumed that the Iraqis enjoy a dramatic 
water surplus (Beaumont 1998). A transfer from the 
Litani River7 is only slightly more imaginable, assuming 
a successful conclusion of peace agreements between 
Israel and Syria and Lebanon, respectively. 
 
Imports from Turkey, however, are currently the topic 
of high-level political discussion between the Israeli and 
Turkish governments and can be considered a distinct 
possibility. At the time of this writing, an Israeli team of 
water managers had just concluded a series of 
negotiations with the Turks for the purchase of 45 
MCM/annum of freshwater between 2001 and 2003. The 
pending purchase has been described by the Israeli 
negotiators as an “emergency measure” to meet demand 
until desalination facilities can be completed, ostensibly 
by 2003 (Cohen 2000b). Though the Turks are likely to 
sell the water from the Manavgat River for under 
$0.10/m3, the full economic cost of the import will 
reach at least $0.85/m3 once taxes and tariffs, shipping, 
processing at each port, and connection to the Israeli 
National Water Carrier are included. Given these high 
costs relative to Mekorot claims of seawater 
desalination costs, the Israeli parliament has begun to 
consider legislation requiring the immediate planning of 
desalination facilities. 
 
Even before verifying that desalinating Mediterranean 
seawater can be achieved at the costs that Mekorot 
claims, one may question the logic of transporting vast 
amounts of freshwater to the region on other grounds. 
Presumably, the import is meant to relieve agricultural 
irrigation demand as much as municipal demand. 
Importing water at relatively high cost, even while the 
import of additional cereals and vegetables (virtual 
water) is possible at a fraction of the economic cost, is 
indeed difficult to justify on efficiency grounds. The 
frequently-offered response in the region, as intimated 
above, is that choosing virtual water over actual water 
imports would incur a substantial social cost among 
farm communities. Increased crop imports – as a 
substitute for water imports – would be doubly 
damaging to local agriculture in that it would also 
introduce increased competition. 
 
 
Wastewater Reclamation.  
 
What is frequently left out of discussions of both 
desalination and water imports is that the increase of the 
upper bound on water availability that results from the 
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exploitation of the unconventional supplies causes a 
resultant increase in the production of wastewater, and 
the subsequent availability of treated wastewater as an 
alternative source of freshwater. A variety of 
technologies exist for treating both domestic and 
industrial wastewater to levels sufficient for non-
potable, or with considerably more expense, potable 
reuse. In Israel, the volume of reclaimed wastewater 
reached 250 MCM in 1994 with the overwhelming 
majority of that used to irrigate crops. This value 
represents an impressive 65 percent of the combined 
domestic/municipal/industrial sewage stream (Eitan 
1995).8 (Note however that 20-30 percent of non-
irrigation freshwater distributed to end-users never 
reaches the sewer system.) 
 
A CAUTIOUS APPROACH: THE SUPPLY 
AUGMENTATION POTENTIAL AND POSSIBLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF WASTEWATER 
RECLAMATION  
 
The operative term in this context is “non-irrigation.” 
As mentioned above, agricultural irrigation is the 
dominant use of freshwater in Israel and Jordan. The 
water used to irrigate crops cannot be substantially 
reclaimed because, where high-efficiency drip and 
microsprayer irrigation systems are largely in place, 
most irrigation water is either incorporated into plant 
biomass or evapotranspired. No more than about 15 
percent of the total volume of freshwater extracted by 
Israel for human use is reclaimed for reuse. The 
equivalent regionwide percentage in 1994 (again, 
excluding Syria) was well under 10 percent, a lower 
figure because wastewater reuse is currently less 
established in Jordan and negligible in the Palestinian 
areas. 
 
 
The GTZ and CES Consulting Engineers (1996) 
estimate that the volume of additional wastewater 
available for reclamation projected out to the year 2040 
is nearly 1.5 BCM/annum (p. 17). A more realistic figure 
is approximately 1 BCM/annum, still a mighty amount.9 
To place this volume in proper context we must take 
note of the GTZ/CES projections of total human water 
demand in the region in 2040. The range of values 
offered is 4.3-5 BCM/annum. Based on these projections 
and the above calculation of wastewater reclamation 
potential, it appears as though it may be possible to 
more than double current rate of sewage reclamation. 
 
Risk and Opportunity.  
 
The option of recycling wastewater is not without its 
dangers. Substantial attention has been paid to the 
human health risks associated with sewage irrigation, 
largely via infection by parasitic and to a lesser degree, 
bacterial pathogens (Shuval and Fattal 1999; Cifuentes 
1998; Shuval et al. 1997; Shuval et al. 1989; Shuval et 
al. 1986; Camann et al. 1983; Clark et al. 1981; 
Sanchez-Levya 1976). This research, along with 
additional work on pond systems (Mara and Pearson 
1999; Mara et al. 1992; Mara and Cairncross 1989), has 
demonstrated that virtually any properly designed 
treatment system can reliably treat municipal sewage to 
safe levels for both restricted and unrestricted irrigation, 
at least with respect to pathogenic and oxygen-demand 
parameters. 
 
Salinity, however, remains a difficult problem. Indeed, 
the otherwise effective low-cost pond/reservoir systems 
that are in such widespread use throughout the region 
actually tend to increase the salinity of the effluent. 
Prominent voices in the region have attempted to bring 
the salinity problem to the attention of planners and the 
public with indeterminate success. A former Israeli 
Water Commissioner argues that irrigating crops with 
treated wastewater whose chloride concentrations 
surpass 400 ppm ought to be banned due to the threats 
that such saline water poses to groundwater quality, soil 
quality, and crop yields (Zaslavsky 1999). Others argue 
that salinization of soils is a function of irrigation 
generally and is not particular to irrigation with 
wastewater. In their view, irrigation with treated sewage 
– indeed, irrigation with any waters of higher salinity – 
may be permissible so long as proper drainage and 
water management practices are applied (Shevah 2000).  
 
Salinity removal has not been a traditional design 
objective of wastewater treatment engineering but it is 
likely to become a standard feature of treatment systems 
in arid regions in years to come. Treated wastewater in 
the region can be thought of as brackish water, 
containing TDS concentrations in the low (1-5) parts per 
thousand (ppt) range. The economic cost of desalinating 
brackish water has been estimated at about half that of 
desalinating seawater (GTZ and CES Consulting 
Engineers 1996; WRI 1992; Glueckstern 1991), and the 
sources of exploitable wastewater are well distributed 
throughout the region (spatially), whereas seawater 
must be conveyed at great distances and up dramatic 
topographic gradients to reach consumer centers. 
 
It must be recalled, however, that desalination 
technologies do not recover the full volume of the input 
water (see above). Depending on the influent salinity, 
the recovery rate for wastewater is some 60-90 percent, 
with the filtrate requiring disposal as waste brine. Thus, 
depending on the extent of the implementation of 
desalination facilities for sewage reclamation, the 
potential for wastewater recovery may be substantially 
reduced (while effluent qualities are improved). 
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THE GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE 
UNCONVENTIONAL SUPPLIES GENERALLY 
AND WASTEWATER RECLAMATION IN 
PARTICULAR 
 
A First General Concern: Bilateralism.  
 
Water management plays an important role in both the 
existing agreements between Israel and Jordan and 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as in the 
ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority and between Israel and Syria. 
 
Despite the fact that the water resources under 
discussion encompass Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, 
and Syrian jurisdictions and that there is a committee on 
water in the multilateral component of the Middle East 
peace process, each of the substantive agreements on 
water to date have resulted from bilateral (as opposed to 
multilateral) negotiations. Although the bilateral format 
has until now been more effective at achieving 
agreements, a shortcoming of the approach is that 
important third parties in multiriparian basins are left 
out of the resolutions. Simply put, the pie tends to be 
divided without all the consumers present at the table. 
The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace is an example of such 
an agreement, with the waters of the Yarmuk tributary 
and the mainstem of the Jordan distributed between 
Israel and Jordan as though Syria and the Palestinians 
were not riparians to the watershed. In sum, the only 
challenge to unilateralism in water development in the 
region has been bilateral, rather than basin-wide 
multilateral agreement. 
 
A Second General Concern: Ignorance of Variability.   
 
The practice of allocating fixed volumes among 
riparians, rather than allocating percentages of variable 
flow over some defined time period is a problematic 
characteristic of the existing Arab-Israeli water 
agreements. In the Israeli-Jordanian case, for example, 
Jordan is presently allocated 30 MCM each summer from 
the upper Jordan River downstream of the outlet of Sea 
of Galilee, 20 MCM of which it receives in return for 
Israel’s extractions of 20 MCM from Yarmuk tributary in 
winter (Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace 1994 (Annex II, 
Articles I.1.b and I.2.a,d.)). This volume, combined with 
an additional 25 MCM/annum that Israel guaranteed the 
Jordanians under the terms of an agreement reached 
between King Hussein and former Prime Minister 
Netanyahu at Aqaba in May 1997 (CNN 1997), 
amounts to a total fixed volume of 55 MCM/annum.10 
Since, as discussed above, streamflow varies as function 
of rainfall, the proportion of the annual yield that this 
volume represents will differ substantially from year to 
year. Thus, in years of low precipitation, intense 
disputes are likely to result from lower-than-average 
streamflow, as occurred in the spring of 1999 following 
two consecutive winters of extremely low precipitation. 
A diplomatic crisis resulted from Israel’s initial decision 
to deny Jordan portions of the latter’s summer 
allocation, ostensibly due to the formers inability to 
extract its winter share from the Yarmuk due to low 
precipitation in the winter of 1999. Although the dispute 
was resolved through quiet negotiation (CNN 1997) and 
the Israelis eventually provided Jordan with the volume 
it demanded, the dispute would have been avoided 
entirely if the treaty’s water sharing had been based on 
percentages of annual discharge rather than on fixed 
volumes. 
 
Cooperative Management, Variability, and Seawater 
Desalination.  
 
These new supplies have a significant bearing on both 
cooperative management and attention to climatic 
variability in the resolution of water disputes. To begin 
with, the introduction of the unconventional supplies 
changes the size and makeup of the theoretical pie to be 
divided among the riparians through water diplomacy, 
forcing a rethinking of the potential of joint water 
management policy. Furthermore, these supplies tend to 
be far less susceptible to climatic variability than 
conventional sources. 
 
The idea of cooperative water management in the region 
(and in other conflicted watersheds throughout the 
world) has been championed by academics and 
practitioners for decades, and can be traced at least as 
far back as John Wesley Powell, a nineteenth century 
American naturalist and explorer who was among the 
earliest critics of unrestrained settlement of whites in the 
American West: 
 
[American] states bothered Powell . . . their 
borders were nonsensical . . . boxing out 
landscapes, sneering at natural reality, they were 
wholly arbitrary . . . in the West, where the one 
thing that really mattered was water, states should 
logically be formed around watersheds . . . to 
divide the West up any other way was to sow the 
future with rivalries, jealousies, and bitter 
squabbles . . . (Reisner 1986). 
 
Although the joint management approach has 
historically been judged by negotiators as impractical in 
the Middle East context, a recent Israeli newspaper 
report is worth citing as evidence of a possible sea 
change: 
 
Israel is proposing that a regional water agency in 
charge of financing, planning, and developing 
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water resources be established in the Middle East. 
Foreign Minister David Levy proposed … to his 
Jordanian counterpart, Abad el-Ayala Hatib, that a 
meeting be arranged so that experts from Israel 
and Jordan have a chance to discuss the idea 
(Benn 2000). 
 
This piece failed to point out that Minister Levy was 
referring strictly to “new source” development and not 
those waters historically exploited by the region’s 
riparians. Even so, Levy’s declaration is an encouraging 
indication that Israel, the dominant riparian power, has a 
new willingness to pursue development of the 
unconventional supplies in a cooperative and regionally 
integrated way. The emerging importance of the 
unconventional supplies is yet another argument for a 
shift away from the standard zero-sum game analysis of 
the Arab-Israeli water dispute. Additionally, procuring 
foreign assistance for the construction and operation of 
coastal desalination works will almost certainly be 
conditioned on regional technical cooperation and the 
guarantee that increased freshwater supplies will also 
benefit the Palestinian territories and Jordan. 
 
As for the question of variability: one of the great 
advantages of desalination is that it is not climate 
dependent. Desalination-derived water supply is 
guaranteed year-round. Thus, when desalinated water is 
considered in water-sharing or water-allocation 
agreements, actual volumes can be reasonably divided. 
As discussed above, the same is not true for rainfall-
dependent conventional supplies, for which proportions 
of annual discharge are really the only sensible 
parameter to apportion. In the event that desalinated 
seawater is considered as part of the regional freshwater 
stock, then their distribution among the riparians ought 
to be considered separately from the conventional 
supplies. 
 
While the temporal reliability of seawater desalination 
is obviously a major advantage of the technology, it 
may become a complicating factor in water diplomacy. 
However, the redistribution of supplies that involve the 
exchange of a non-climate dependent source with a 
dependent one will create complications. The 
participants in water diplomacy might add reliability 
(climate independence) to simple volumes as a 
negotiation objective.  
 
Wastewater Reclamation and Water Diplomacy.  
 
With respect to variability and the reliability of supply, 
wastewater reclamation lands somewhere in the middle. 
Indeed, the supply of treated wastewater will necessarily 
track human water consumption. The stock will drop 
only as municipal consumption drops, which is 
inconceivable barring radical unforeseen circumstances. 
As to how reclaimed wastewater must be considered in 
this regard in water agreements, apportioning raw 
volumes is likely not a useful guide unless planners can 
agree that they can accurately predict water 
consumption trends several years into the future. 
Otherwise, dividing proportions of the sewage 
generated each year (like dividing proportions of annual 
freshwater yield) is the most sensible approach. 
 
Before considering the question of wastewater 
reclamation and joint water management, we must be 
clear about the fact that the wastewater will play an 
increasing role in the regional water balance in coming 
years. Conflicts over sewage are taking on a 
substantially different character in Israel and Palestine 
than they do almost anywhere else in the world. 
 
When a country discharges wastewater into a 
transboundary river or stream sending it into the 
territory of a downstream neighbor, the resultant 
conflict generally tends to be over the responsibility for 
pollution abatement. The grievance of a downstream 
riparian is that an upstream neighbor is polluting its 
waters. Under conditions of extreme freshwater 
scarcity, however, wastewater ceases to be thought of 
strictly as a disposal problem and begins to assume the 
character of a scarce resource. The operative question 
is transformed from: “whose responsibility is 
wastewater treatment?” to “who enjoys the benefit of 
treated wastewater?” 
 
As populations rise and the amount of wastewater 
generated by human communities continues to rise, the 
stock of available treated wastewater rises in parallel. 
There is an increase in the availability of treated 
wastewater in absolute terms, but also, and more 
importantly, an increase relative to the limited and 
stable availability of conventional water supplies.11 In 
other words, treated wastewater is likely to become a 
much larger relative component of the total available 
freshwater stock in coming decades. 
 
At present, treated wastewater represents a form of 
supply augmentation for non-potable12 uses such as 
agricultural irrigation, thereby freeing up for direct 
human consumption the conventional freshwater 
formerly utilized in agriculture. As the present Middle 
Eastern drought extends into a third year, Israel may 
join Jordan and the Palestinian territories in rationing 
municipal freshwater consumption, even as Israel 
reduces agricultural allocations of freshwater by 60 
percent. The Israeli press cites that in the near future, all 
Israeli irrigation is to draw against reclaimed 
wastewater exclusively, with conventional freshwater 
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and desalinated seawater to be reserved for the cities 
(Cohen 2000a). 
 
For the Palestinian population, whose present 
agricultural consumption of freshwater of any kind is 
miniscule (although substantially higher in Gaza than in 
the West Bank), the availability of reclaimed 
wastewater represents the opportunity for agricultural 
development of previously marginal areas. Rather than 
discharge municipal wastewater into wadi bottoms in 
the West Bank or into the Mediterranean (from the Gaza 
Strip), treated effluent could be used in the cultivation 
of a variety of foodstuffs and commercial crops. 
 
On the other hand, since so little conventional 
freshwater is used in Palestinian agriculture, no 
substantial drinking water offsets via wastewater 
irrigation can be expected from sectoral shifts within the 
Palestinian areas alone. Instead, augmentation of the 
Palestinian municipal drinking water supply via 
wastewater reclamation can only occur through the 
provision of conventional freshwater supplies freed up 
by the availability of treated sewage to Israeli 
agriculture. In other words, the drinking water supply 
augmentation potential of treated wastewater in the 
Palestinian areas is contingent upon water management 
coordinated between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
 
Reuse of wastewater depends on proper storage and 
conveyance. In Israel, reuse occurs in one of two ways. 
In the first, effluent from a centralized urban wastewater 
treatment facility, such as the Shafdan facility serving 
the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, is transported via 
pipeline to agricultural consumers elsewhere in the 
country. In this situation, the producers and consumers 
of wastewater are separate entities. In the Yizre’el 
Valley just southwest of Haifa, for example, effluent 
from Haifa’s wastewater treatment plant is pumped 
approximately 5 km over gradual sloping terrain and is 
stored in a series of ponds for irrigation by farm 
collectives outside of the city. In this and other similar 
cases, consumers of treated sewage must purchase the 
resources from its producers. 
 
In the second scenario, small communities convey their 
wastewater to their own reservoirs for combined 
treatment and storage.13 Then, the treated wastewater is 
conveyed directly over short distances to fields for 
irrigation. In this format, producers of wastewater 
consume their own sewage via local agriculture. As of 
1994, as much as 50 percent of the wastewater in Israel 
(by volume) was reclaimed in this way (Eitan 1995). 
To relieve extreme drinking water scarcity in the 
Palestinian territories, one reasonable solution may be 
for Israeli communities downstream of Palestinian cities 
to exploit Palestinian sewage in return for conventional 
freshwater (albeit not necessarily on an equivalent 
volumetric unit basis). There are a variety of creative 
water exchanges that could be formulated if water were 
to be managed in a truly integrated way. Indeed it has 
been convincingly demonstrated that cooperative 
management at the watershed level has great potential to 
produce synergistic gains (Cohon and Marks 1973). 
 
At the same time, one must acknowledge the difficulty 
in predicting the nature of the final regional 
accommodation that will be achieved between Israel 
and the Palestinians (let alone Israel and Syria). 
Reconciling the principle that “good fences make good 
neighbors” with the very real advantages of cooperative 
water management will surely be a difficult one. 
 
In the meantime, however, a number of joint wastewater 
reclamation projects may be developed as confidence-
building measures. Two are offered below.  
 
In the first, a substantial proportion of the wastewater 
from Jerusalem flows eastward, untreated, through the 
Wadi Nah’r/Nahal Kidron drainage toward the Dead 
Sea (See Figure 6). The current situation there is 
characterized by wasted freshwater, wasted nutrients, 
and a threat to public health. A similar case exists in the 
northern West Bank, where untreated sewage flows 
westward towards Israel proper from Nablus (See 
Figure 7).14 In each case, the wastewater possesses a 
transboundary character in that it either (1) crosses a 
real or proposed jurisdictional boundary or (2) 
originates from sewer systems serving with mixed 
Palestinian and Israeli populations (as is in the case at 
Wadi Nah’r). The advantages of cooperative 
reclamation measures to the Palestinian side include 
Israeli financial contribution, Israeli technical expertise 
(based on several decades of wastewater reclamation in 
Israel proper), the production of substantial additional 
freshwater for agricultural purposes, and the reduction 
of the nuisance and public health hazard of raw sewage 
flowing through its territory. The Israeli interests 
include, in addition to the production of additional 
freshwater and the reduction of public health and 
ecological threats, confidence-building measures for 
normalization of relations. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                          
1 Syria is often irresponsibly left out of discussions of 
the Arab-Israeli water conflict. Indeed, a substantial 
portion of the streamflow of the Yarmuk tributary to the 
Jordan River is contained within Syrian territory and the 
Syrian exploitation of the headwaters of the Yarmuk at 
the al-Wehda Dam was estimated to range from 80 to 
120 MCM/annum in 1994 (GTZ and CES Consulting 
Engineers 1996) and may have risen as high as 200-220 
MCM/annum in 1998 (M. Yzraeli, personal 
communication January 2000).  Lebanon must also be 
considered a riparian to the watershed since one of the 
headwaters to the Upper Jordan River, the Hazbani 
springs, lie within its territory. However, since Lebanon 
is not suffering from water scarcity at anywhere near the 
intensity of that suffered by the other riparians, it is left 
out of the present discussion. 
 
2 Aquifers (as opposed to surface waters) may be 
extracted at greater than 100 percent of annual recharge. 
The word “sustainable” refers in this context to 
withdrawals of groundwater at rates no higher than that 
of recharge, thereby insuring that existing groundwater 
levels are maintained.  
 
3 In statistically rare years of extremely high 
precipitation, the total annual renewable freshwater 
                                                                                           
stock for the region may reach 4 BCM. The demand 
value of 7.2 BCM assumes that the Syrian population 
dependent on the waters of the Yarmuk River is 500,000 
and that the per-capita water requirement for food self-
sufficiency is 560 m3/annum, as estimated by Cohen 
(1995). 
 
4 In the West Bank, Palestinian agriculture remains 
primarily rainfed, partly due to Israeli restrictions on 
Palestinian water use since 1967. The gradual transfer 
of West Bank territory to Palestinian control has 
increased Palestinian irrigation, but the proportion of 
Palestinian water used in irrigated agriculture is still 
under 5 percent of total water use. 
 
5 Recall that the 9 MCM/yr Santa Barbara RO facility 
would consume 50 million kWh/yr if operated 
continuously. This means that an 800 MCM/yr facility, 
even with the benefit of innovation and economies of 
scale, will consume energy at a rate of several hundred 
million kWh/yr. 
 
6 The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace distributes the yield 
of the Upper Jordan River basin in such a way that 
requires the linking of instructures so that water can be 
transferred from the Sea of Galilee to Jordanian 
conveyance to Amman. See the Treaty’s Annex II, 
Articles I.1.b and I.2.a,d. 
 
7 For discussion of the possibility that Israeli diversion 
of the waters of the Litani may already have taken 
place, refer to Amery (1998; 1993) and Wolf (1998). 
 
8 This combined sewage volume includes Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as well as 
portions of several of larger Palestinian cities whose 
sewer systems are included in the wastewater 
management survey published by the Israeli 
government. 
 
9 Assume that close to all of the wastewater produced by 
the human communities of the region can be exploited 
for reuse in either agricultural or urban irrigation as well 
as an aggregated regional sewage production figure of 
40 m3/capita/annum. This figure is a population-
weighted average that has been adjusted based on the 
following additional assumptions: 20 percent of 
freshwater distributed to non-agriculture users is either 
incorporated, evapotranspired, or returned to surface 
and groundwaters without reaching the sewer system; 
and existing “un-accounted for” water rates (15 percent 
in Israel, 55 percent in Jordan, 40 percent in the West 
Bank, and 50 percent in Gaza) will remain unchanged 
over the next four decades. If we also assume that per 
capita freshwater consumption rates will also remain 
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constant, then we may very simply estimate the 
available reclaimed wastewater volume to equal 40 
m3/annum multiplied by the regional population in any 
given year. A mid-range population prediction for the 
study area for the year 2040 is 28 million. (Note that 
this analysis, too, excludes the Syrian component.) 
 
10 The 1997 Aqaba agreement stipulated that the transfer 
of the flow to Jordan would last for a period of three 
years, although there is a reasonable possibility that 
Israel will agree to continue the transfers indefinitely. 
 
11 The term “stable stock” is, of course, a bit of a 
misnomer because of the extreme variability in rainfall 
on an interannual basis. 
 
12 Improving the quality of effluent from irrigation-
grade to drinking water-grade is neither technically 
challenging nor particularly expensive, but there is not 
yet a readiness on the part of the public to accept that 
drinking directly recycled sewage, when properly 
treated, is completely safe. 
 
13 For detailed description of hybrid pond/reservoir 
treatment systems, see Mara and Pearson (1999) and 
Juanico and Dor (1999).  
 
14 In the cases of both Nablus and Jerusalem, the city 
lies on the watershed divide, and sewage flows both 
eastward and westward into two different watersheds. 
The eastern drainage of Nablus, Wadi Fara, is not 
considered in this paper since it is likely that the bulk of 
the territory through which the stream flows will be 
under Palestinian jurisdiction following the final status 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
Similarly, the western drainage of Jerusalem, Nahal 
Sorek, flows almost entirely through Israel and is 
currently treated and reused within Israel.  
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Figure 1. The surface water resources of the Jordan River watershed along with the shared Israeli-
Palestinian coastal drainages. 
 
Figure 2. The major groundwater resources available to the riparians of the Jordan River watershed. 
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Figure 3. Crude water balance diagram. Water use figures are for the year 2000, estimated by 
multiplying multi-year average per-capita consumption data for each country by population 
estimates for the year 2000. The uncertainty range for water availability is derived from an 
assumed 25% coefficient of variation for rainfall over the region. The uncertainty range for water 
use is based on its non-linear relationship with water availability. Syrian water use assumes a 
population of 500,000 in the Yarmuk basin utilizing 200 m3/capita/annum. 
 
Figure 4. Topography of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, rendered in 3-D with a 
vertical exaggeration of approximately 50x. 
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Figure 5. Possible international water transfers in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
 
 
Figure 6. Wadi Nah’r / Nahal Kidron joint reclamation area (proposed). 
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Figure 7. Wadi Zaymar / Nahal Alexander joint reclamation area (proposed). 
 
